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Nuclear regulation has faced a variety of challenges since the Atomic
Energy Commission first introduced the procedure of two-step licensing, in
which construction and operational licenses are issued separately to
nuclear reactor developers. Since 1974, and the establishment of the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the process for licensing a nuclear power
plant has changed dramatically. In addition to the two-step licensing
process of old, developers now have the option of choosing a one-step
combined license, which offers more flexibility in terms of developing
technical specifications. The two-step and combined license options are
codified under 10 C.F.R. §§ 50 and 52, respectively. Although intended to
streamline the process and avoid expensive licensing periods that plagued
plant development under the old regime, the newer combined license
method is not being executed as planned and runs the risk of confronting
developers with the same economic hurdles. This Note examines both
licensing options and posits that a new strategy must be developed to
efficiently license the next generation of nuclear power plants.
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INTRODUCTION
The success of the commercial nuclear industry has fluctuated
significantly over the past several decades due to a wide variety of safety
related, economic, and political developments.1 Recently, there has been a
growing movement towards expanding nuclear power in the United States
once again.2 Despite the renewed interest, support for nuclear power has
1. See Toni Johnson, Nuclear Power Expansion Challenges, COUNCIL ON
FOREIGN REL. (Mar. 18, 2011), http://www.cfr.org/united-states/nuclear-powerexpansion-challenges/p16886#p4 (noting the impact of the environmentalist
movement, changing federal regulations, and the large cost required to construct a
reactor).
2. See Licensing New Nuclear Power Plants, NUCLEAR ENERGY INST. (Oct. 2010),
http://www.nei.org/resourcesandstats/documentlibrary/newplants/factsheet/licensingne
wnuclearpowerplants/?page=4 [hereinafter NEI LICENSING FACTSHEET] (attributing
policy makers’ increased support for nuclear power to factors, such as reliability,
pollution concerns, and desires for a diversified energy portfolio); see also Economic
Benefits of New Plants, NUCLEAR ENERGY INST., http://www.nei.org/keyissues
/newnuclearplants/economicbenefitsofnewnuclearplants/ (last visited Mar. 16, 2012)
(detailing the significant economic benefits plant construction presents to state and
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also proven to be polarizing; concerns over improper nuclear waste
disposal and plant safety are hotly debated issues.3 Public opposition to
nuclear plants was propelled further following the accident at Three Mile
Island in 1979, calling into question the desirability of large-scale nuclear
power production.4 These concerns have been surfaced yet again following
the recent developments at Japan’s Fukushima Daiichi plant in 2011.5
Notwithstanding the myriad safety concerns, the economics of plant
development remains perhaps the most significant barrier to nuclear
production.6 The construction and operation of nuclear facilities is an
expensive business, which must also factor in decommissioning and waste
disposal costs, among others.7 Cost overruns and construction delays
witnessed in the 1970s and 1980s remain a crucial issue today in the debate
over the economics of nuclear power.8 Long construction periods tend to
significantly increase financing costs and push overall project costs well
beyond initial estimates.9 Furthermore, with abundant shale-gas deposits
contributing to even lower electricity rates,10 the high cost of developing a
plant due to extended construction and engineering time may easily
“dampen enthusiasm for major nuclear expansion.”11
local economies).
3. See Johnson, supra note 1 (describing the obstacles and arguments against
nuclear power).
4. See David A. Repka & Kathryn M. Sutton, The Revival of Nuclear Power Plant
Licensing, 19 NAT. RES. & ENV’T. 39, 39 (2005) (characterizing the state of the
industry as “moribund” following the Three Mile Island disaster).
5. See Johnson, supra note 1 (describing how the Fukushima disaster “has raised
new questions” about nuclear power safety and whether it is a necessary component of
the country’s energy future).
6. See id. (characterizing spiraling costs as the “biggest hurdle” for the nuclear
industry); see also The Dream That Failed, ECONOMIST, Mar. 10, 2012,
http://www.economist.com/node/21549098 (noting that forecast reductions in capital
costs for plant construction have not materialized while construction periods have
lengthened).
7. See The Economics of Nuclear Power, WORLD NUCLEAR ASS’N (July 2012),
http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/inf02.html (discussing the impact of fuel
procurement and management, capital costs, and financing on the cost competitiveness
of nuclear generation, compared to other energy alternatives).
8. See Justin Gundlach, What’s the Cost of New Nuclear Plants? The Answer’s
Gonna Cost You: Risk-Based Approach to Estimating the Costs of New Nuclear Power
Plants, 18 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 600, 620 (2011) (outlining the argument between
opponents and proponents of new nuclear development).
9. See The Economics of Nuclear Power, supra note 7 (illustrating the variability
in financing costs with Georgia Power’s proposed AP1000 reactors as an example,
which were estimated to cost between $9.6 million and $14 billion depending on
whether the project could be financed progressively by ratepayers).
10. Rebecca Smith, Cheap Natural Gas Unplugs U.S. Nuclear-Power Revival,
WALL ST. J., Mar. 16, 2012, at A1.
11. See SHARON SQUASSONI, NUCLEAR ENERGY: REBIRTH OR RESUSCITATION? 34
(2009), available at http://carnegieendowment.org/files/nuclear_energy_rebirth_
resuscitation.pdf (arguing that the combination of federal subsidies and policies that
disincentivize carbon-based electricity generation may overcome financial barriers to
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At the nexus of these issues is nuclear regulation. The government
oversees nuclear licensing and regulation in the United States and must
balance the need for advancing economical electricity generation with
public opinion and safety.12 This Note examines broadly the licensing
options available to nuclear plant developers today and suggests that the
regulations need to be adapted to avoid the economic pitfalls of costly
design and engineering-related delays for the advanced nuclear systems
known as Generation IV reactors. Part I describes the history of nuclear
reactor licensing, provides background on the Generation IV initiative, and
introduces the prototype being developed in the United States, known as
the Next Generation Nuclear Power Plant (“NGNP”). Part II outlines the
feasibility of licensing a Generation IV reactor under today’s available
alternatives, while Part III provides broad suggestions for improving these
alternatives.
I.

A BACKGROUND ON NUCLEAR POWER REGULATION AND
GENERATION IV TECHNOLOGY

A. Historical Underpinnings of Nuclear Power Regulation
The Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (“1954 Act”) governs the operation and
regulation of nuclear energy13 and gave licensing and enforcement power to
the Atomic Energy Commission (“AEC”), which previously maintained
jurisdiction over both military and civilian applications of nuclear
technology.14 Eventually, Congress decided to abandon the AEC entirely
due to its controversial policies and split the organization’s regulatory and
promotional duties under the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974.15 As part
of the split, Congress granted authority over civilian nuclear regulation,
enforcement, and licensing to the newly created Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (“NRC”).16 The NRC formally began its regulatory oversight

production).
12. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission is tasked with regulating nuclear reactors,
See About NRC, U.S. NUCLEAR REG’Y COMM’N,
materials, and waste.
http://www.nrc.gov/about-nrc.html (last updated Mar. 29, 2012).
13. Atomic Energy Act of 1954, 42 U.S.C. § 2011 (2012).
14. See
Governing
Legislation,
U.S.
NUCLEAR
REG’Y
COMM’N,
http://www.nrc.gov/about-nrc/governing-laws.html (last updated Sept. 25, 2012).
15. See History, U.S. NUCLEAR REG’Y COMM’N, http://www.nrc.gov/aboutnrc/history.html (last updated Sept. 5, 2012) (describing the increasing scrutiny of the
Atomic Energy Commission’s regulations in the 1960s, particularly its policies on
siting and radiation and environmental protection standards).
16. See Christopher C. Chandler, Recent Developments in Licensing and
Regulation at the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 58 ADMIN. L. REV. 485, 487 (2006)
(reporting that later amendments to the Energy Reorganization Act also provided
protection for whistle blowers).
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duties in 1975.17
B. Two-Step Licensing Under 10 C.F.R. § 50
The NRC continued to use the licensing process developed by the AEC
under the 1954 Act, codified in 10 C.F.R. § 50 (“Part 50”) of the AEC’s
regulations.18 The primary components of the two-step licensing process
are the construction permit and the operating license.19 Applicants must
first apply for a construction permit, which requires extensive review by
the NRC of the preliminary reactor design specifications.20 Following a
successful public hearing and an environmental review conducted in
accordance with the National Environmental Policy Act, the NRC may
approve a construction permit or authorize the licensee to complete a
minimal amount of construction on the plant before the permit is issued.21
Developers must next obtain operating licenses to bring a constructed
plant into full operation.22 Operating license applications are only
permitted once the plant’s construction is substantially complete.23 The
applications, furthermore, contain a final safety analysis, an environmental
report on the plant’s design, as well as emergency plans in case of a
malfunction.24
C. Combined Licensing Under 10 C.F.R. § 52
In 1989, the NRC developed new regulations, codified in 10 C.F.R § 52
(“Part 52”), as an alternative to licensing a nuclear power plant. The
regulation25 attempts to mitigate the economic burden and cost overruns of
nuclear plant development by enabling developers to resolve design and
17. Energy Reorganization Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 5841–5845 (2006) (including safety
oversight, license renewal, and application review for new nuclear plants as among the
duties of the NRC); see History, supra note 15.
18. See U.S. NUCLEAR REG’Y COMM’N, NUREG/BR-0298, NUCLEAR POWER
PLANT LICENSING PROCESS 2–3 (July 2004), available at http://www.nrc.gov/readingrm/doc-collections/nuregs/brochures/br0298/br0298r2.pdf.
19. Id. at 2.
20. The review requires that applicants provide safety analysis information,
environmental reviews, and financial statements. See id. at 2–3.
21. See NUCLEAR POWER PLANT LICENSING PROCESS, supra note 18, at 2–3
(explaining that applicants are allowed to commence plant construction only after the
NRC is satisfied with the proposed site and preliminary plant design); see also 10
C.F.R. § 50.10(c), (d)(1)–(3) (2012) (clarifying both the scope and the conditions under
which an applicant will be granted a limited work authorization, which allows for
preliminary construction, such as driving of piles, subsurface preparation, or foundation
installation).
22. NUCLEAR POWER PLANT LICENSING PROCESS, supra note 18, at 4.
23. M. Stanford Blanton et al., The NRC’s Improved Licensing Process for
Commercial Nuclear Power Plants—in Theory and Practice, 49 INFRASTRUCTURE 3, 7
(2010).
24. NUCLEAR POWER PLANT LICENSING PROCESS, supra note 18, at 4.
25. See 10 C.F.R. § 52.0(a) (2012).
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environmental licensing requirements before the start of construction by
giving applicants more options.26
Long Island’s Shoreham facility serves as a stark reminder of the
licensing issues the NRC intends to avoid with Part 52; it was the first fullsized nuclear power plant to be decommissioned and closed before being
fully powered.27 The Shoreham plant collapsed under intense scrutiny
following disagreements over a proposed emergency evacuation plan.28 In
the end, Shoreham’s cost was approximately eighty times higher29 than
original estimates and saddled Long Island ratepayers with some of the
highest electric rates in the nation.30
Part 52 employs a more modular approach to licensing and was enacted,
among other reasons, to prevent another Shoreham-like saga from
burdening ratepayers. The major components of the licensing scheme
under Part 52 are the Early Site Permit (“ESP”), Standard Design
Certification (“SDC”), and the Combined License (“COL”).31
The ESPs grant NRC approval of a proposed site with a permit that lasts
roughly ten to twenty years from the date it is issued.32 The permits
address site safety, environmental, and emergency issues, which are
investigated independent of a nuclear plant’s design and in conjunction
with the Federal Emergency Management Agency.33
SDCs signify NRC approval of the design of a nuclear plant and are
26. Blanton et al., supra note 23, at 8. Public hearings were also streamlined under
Part 52 to be less formalized and more affordable, thereby encouraging public
participation. See Repka & Sutton, supra note 4, at 44.
27. See Blanton et al., supra note 23, at 8 (describing the issues, mostly related to
public safety and emergency procedures, that caused the Shoreham facility to be denied
an operating license); see also Shoreham Advisory Committee, LONG ISLAND POWER
AUTH., http://www.lipower.org/shoreham/history.html (last visited Oct. 15, 2012)
(chronicling the decommissioning process, which began in 1991 and cost $186
million).
28. See Timothy Bolger, Nuclear Waste: 20 Years After Shoreham’s Closure,
ISLAND
PRESS,
June
11,
2009,
at
12,
available
at
LONG
http://www.longislandpress.com/2009/06/11/nuclear-waste-20-years-after-the-closureof-the-shoreham-power-facility/ (observing the public relations impact of the
Chernobyl and Three Mile Island meltdowns on Shoreham’s development).
29. Shoreham Advisory Committee, supra note 27.
30. Frequently
Asked
Questions,
LONG
ISLAND
POWER
AUTH.,
http://www.lipower.org/residential/custserv/faq/faq-shoreham.html (last visited Oct.
15,
2012);
FIX
LIPA,
CITIZENS
CAMPAIGN
FOR
THE
ENV’T,
http://www.citizenscampaign.org/campaigns/fix-lipa.asp (last updated Mar. 30, 2010).
31. 10 C.F.R. § 52.0(a) (2012).
32. See Early Site Permit Applications for New Reactors, U.S. NUCLEAR REG’Y
COMM’N, http://www.nrc.gov/reactors/new-reactors/esp.html (last updated Mar. 29,
2012) (stating that the public may participate in application reviews or request hearings
on ESP issuances).
33. See NUCLEAR POWER PLANT LICENSING PROCESS, supra note 18, at 6–7 (listing
information required for a complete application, such as seismic data and emergency
evacuation plans).
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reviewed independently of applications to bring the plant into operation.34
SDCs also verify the design of a reactor for roughly fifteen years and
include “proposed tests, inspections, analyses, and acceptance criteria for
the standard design” (“ITAAC”).35 This SDC stage is particularly
important under the new licensing scheme and allows the developer to
submit a design control document (“DCD”), which describes all the
“essential features and functions of the nuclear plant” for approval before
the NRC begins reviewing the combined operating and construction
license.36
The COL is the most important addition to Part 52. It allows developers
to apply for a construction and operational license in one phase while
referencing a previously approved ESP and DCD.37 A COL is issued based
on a certified set of design specifications and requires the licensee to
demonstrate that the ITAAC referenced in the DCD are satisfied.38 Once
approved, a COL is valid for forty years.39
D. Generation IV Technology and the Next Generation Nuclear Plant
Project
Reactors in operation today are most commonly based on light water
technology and use ordinary water as a coolant.40 These reactors were
primarily constructed in the 1960s and 1970s and are classified as
“Generation II” designs.41
Reactor designs currently planned for
construction and licensing are known as “Generation III” or “III+” reactors,
which offer simpler designs and more advanced safety features.42 The even
more advanced “Generation IV” energy systems, which may not be
34. During the design certification review, the NRC also informs stakeholders and
the public how they can participate in the regulatory process. See Design Certification
Applications
for
New
Reactors,
U.S.
NUCLEAR
REG’Y
COMM’N,
http://www.nrc.gov/reactors/new-reactors/design-cert.html (last updated July 3, 2012).
35. See NUCLEAR POWER PLANT LICENSING PROCESS, supra note 18, at 8
(describing limitations on changes to NRC certified designs).
36. See Blanton et al., supra note 23, at 8.
37. See id. (noting that the NRC intended for licensees to “finalize design and site
issues before applying for a combined license”).
38. 10 C.F.R. § 52.103(g) (2012); see NUCLEAR POWER PLANT LICENSING
PROCESS, supra note 18, at 9 (describing the requirements a licensee must demonstrate
to ensure the plant has been constructed safely).
39. Combined License Applications for New Reactors, U.S. NUCLEAR REG’Y
COMM’N, http://www.nrc.gov/reactors/new-reactors/col.html (last updated Mar. 29,
2012).
40. Light
Water
Reactor,
U.S.
NUCLEAR
REG’Y
COMM’N,
http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/basic-ref/glossary/light-water-reactor.html
(last
updated Mar. 29, 2012) (noting that boiling water reactors and pressurized water
reactors are the most common types of reactors in the United States).
41. Gundlach, supra note 8, at 623.
42. See id. at 622–23 (noting that newer designs have more generating capacity and
feature “passive” safety systems, which can operate autonomously).
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commissioned for commercial use until 2030, depart from the water-cooled
design model and are currently being researched.43
The Generation IV International Forum is coordinating the multinational
research effort to develop these advanced systems.44 Ten countries agreed
to cooperate on Generation IV research and develop six prototype
technologies to be deployed internationally by 2030.45 The Generation IV
Initiative strives to develop advanced nuclear technology that will make
waste more manageable, increase safety performance, and improve the
long-term economic viability of new plants.46 In terms of performance,
Generation IV reactor designs mark an improvement over existing reactors
by offering greater safety, reliability, and efficiency.47 The new systems
will also reduce toxicity and heat generated by nuclear waste and instead
provide “process heat” for a wide variety of secondary applications, such as
large-scale hydrogen production.48
The Energy Policy Act of 2005 (“2005 Act”) played a significant role in
furthering the development of advanced nuclear plants by funding research
and providing significant financial incentives to developers.49 The 2005
Act also formally authorized the NGNP Project as the official pilot
program for next generation nuclear reactors in the United States.50 Among
the candidates considered by the Initiative is the Very-High Temperature
Reactor (“VHTR”), a helium-cooled reactor concept that operates at much
43. See Generation IV Nuclear Reactors, WORLD NUCLEAR ASS’N, http://worldnuclear.org/info/inf77.html (last updated Dec. 2010) (detailing the six different
technologies being researched for Generation IV reactors).
44. See generally U.S. DEPT. OF ENERGY RES. ADVISORY COMM. & GENERATION IV
INT’L. FORUM, A TECHNOLOGY ROADMAP FOR GENERATION IV NUCLEAR SYSTEMS:
TEN NATIONS PREPARING TODAY FOR TOMORROW’S ENERGY NEEDS (2002), available
at http://www.gen-4.org/PDFs/GenIVRoadmap.pdf [hereinafter GEN IV ROADMAP]
(summarizing the need to develop new nuclear systems to meet future energy
demands).
45. Argentina, Brazil, Canada, France, Japan, the Republic of Korea, the Republic
of South Africa, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States were initial
members of the multi-national research initiative. See id. at 5–9.
46. See id. at 5–6 (emphasizing seven goals of the international effort and the need
to collaborate on research and development).
47. See Jacques Bouchard & Ralph Bennett, Generation IV Advanced Nuclear
Energy Systems, 26 NUCLEAR PLANT J. 42, 45 (2008), available at http://www.gen4.org/PDFs/NPJ_Vol26_No5_Generation_IV_Bouchard_Bennett_Sep-Oct_2008.pdf
(noting that Generation IV reactors extract energy from a larger fraction of uranium in
fuel than Generation III reactors, extending the life of the fuel considerably).
48. See id.
49. See U.S. Nuclear Power Policy, WORLD NUCLEAR ASS’N, http://worldnuclear.org/info/inf41_US_nuclear_power_policy.html (last updated Sept. 2012)
(discussing federal incentives under the 2005 Act, including federal risk insurance, tax
credits, and loan guarantees up to eighty percent of the project cost for advanced
reactors).
50. U.S. DEPT. OF ENERGY, NEXT GENERATION NUCLEAR PLANT: A REPORT TO
CONGRESS 3 (Apr. 2010), available at http://www.ne.doe.gov/pdfFiles/
NGNP_ReporttoCongress_2010.pdf [hereinafter 2010 NGNP REPORT].
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higher temperatures than existing light water reactors (“LWR”).51 In
addition to its increased generation capacity, the VHTR can recycle spent
fuel from LWR and VHTR reactors to reduce the amount of resulting
waste.52 This gas-cooled design was selected as the prototype reactor for
the NGNP53 and is to be constructed at Idaho National Laboratory, where
the efficiency of the new reactor as well as its applicability to the industrial
and transportation sectors will be studied.54 The higher temperature of the
reactor will enable the plant to produce electricity for industrial processes,
such as coal or synthetic oil refinement, as well as other uses.55
The NGNP Project executes in two phases.56 Phase 1 covers conceptual
design work and technical work, while Phase 2 covers the final design
leading to the construction and licensing of the prototype reactor.57 Phase 2
aims to establish a full licensing implementation plan for the advanced
reactor design.58 Among other considerations, the unique design of the
plant and its fuel procedures will likely require some changes to the current
regulatory structure.59
II. 10 C.F.R. § 52 IS AN IMPROVEMENT OVER THE PREVIOUS
LICENSING SCHEME, BUT MUST BE FURTHER OPTIMIZED FOR
INCOMING GENERATION IV REACTORS
Existing regulations have been developed primarily based on technical
experience with Generation II LWR technology.60 Due to several
51. See GEN IV ROADMAP, supra note 44, at 48.
52. See id. at 51 (noting the VHTR’s symbiotic fuel cycle, which can “achieve

significant reductions in waste quantities”).
53. See 2010 NGNP REPORT, supra note 50, at 3 (explaining that the VHTR was
identified as the economical choice for development). Specifically, the High
Temperature Gas Reactor, a helium-cooled VHTR, was selected as the NGNP
prototype. The High Temperature Gas Cooled Reactor (HTGR), NGNP INDUSTRY
ALLIANCE LTD., http://www.ngnpalliance.org/index.php/htgr (last visited Dec. 15,
2012).
54. U.S. Nuclear Power Policy, supra note 49.
55. Id.
56. Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-58, §§ 641–643, 119 Stat. 594, 794
(codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 16021–16023 (2006)) (establishing the NGNP Project and
detailing how it should be organized).
57. See Energy Policy Act of 2005 § 643, 119 Stat. at 794 (outlining the research,
development, and demonstration efforts to occur in Phase I).
58. See id.
59. Anticipating this need, the NRC planned for the project to take five years, with
an anticipated COL application filed within the next few years. See U.S. Nuclear
Power Policy, supra note 49.
60. See WILLIAM D. TAVERS, COMM’N PAPER SECY-02-019, PLAN FOR RESOLVING
POLICY ISSUES RELATED TO LICENSING NON-LIGHT WATER REACTOR DESIGNS (2002),
available at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/commission/secys/2002/
secy2002-0139/2002-0139scy.html [hereinafter NRC POLICY PAPER] (explaining that
current regulations reflect experience gained from LWR operation).
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technology-neutral provisions, the existing regulatory framework can be
used to structure licensing for non-LWR systems.61 Still, the operational
systems of Generation IV reactors are substantially different from LWRs.62
Considering the technical complexity of advanced reactors and historical
shortcomings of the licensing process, the existing licensing options may
be insufficient for Generation IV systems.
A. 10 C.F.R. § 50 Is Not Well-Suited to Efficiently License Generation
IV Nuclear Reactors
Supporters of licensing under Part 50 suggest a plant could be deployed
and available for commercial use more quickly than under other
alternatives, providing more certainty for investors.63 Although an earlier
construction start is more feasible with Part 50, construction rework and
severe delays are more probable, as the industry has little experience with
the more technically complex Generation IV reactors.64 If initial capital
costs are deemed by investors to be unrecoverable within a reasonable time
after the plant is operational, construction may be suspended or even
cancelled.65
Perhaps most indicative of the drawbacks of licensing under Part 50 is
the NRC’s overhaul in 1989 of the licensing process to create a more
“attractive environment for new utility investments in nuclear power.”66 In
the end, the gains observed by accelerated initial construction are likely
offset by extensive delays and expensive retrofits, thereby jeopardizing the
development and future commercial operation of the entire plant.67
61. See id.
62. See Wolfgang Hoffelner et al., New Generation Reactors, in ENERGY AND

POWER GENERATION HANDBOOK: ESTABLISHED AND EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES Ch. 23,
12 (K.R. Rao ed., 2011), available at http://www.krrao.org/images/
DKM_Comments_Chapter23_corrected_version_aug23.pdf (explaining that the
advanced structural materials operate under more demanding conditions and must
endure “different types of damage during their life time”).
63. The perception is that private-sector financing would be more attracted to the
quicker initial timeline, and thus, readily available under this licensing alternative. See
U.S. DEPT. OF ENERGY & U.S. NUCLEAR REG’Y COMM’N, NEXT GENERATION NUCLEAR
PLANT LICENSING STRATEGY: A REPORT TO CONGRESS 15 (Aug. 2008), available at
http://www.ne.doe.gov/pdfFiles/NGNP_reporttoCongress.pdf [hereinafter 2008 NGNP
REPORT]. Yet, the DOE and NRC disagree with this viewpoint, asserting that licensing
under Part 50 presents the “greatest risk.” See id. at 16.
64. See id. at 16 (predicting that, should issues remain unresolved, “significant
design changes will likely be required during the [operational license] stage of
review”).
65. See Richard Goldsmith, Regulatory Reform and the Revival of Nuclear Power,
20 HOFSTRA L. REV. 159, 186 (1991) (noting that licensing delays, exponential cost
growth, and investor concerns under the two-step process resulted in fewer plant
orders).
66. Id.
67. Post-investment delays are an investor’s “greatest fear.” Gundlach, supra note
8, at 642 (citing Roland M. Frye, Jr., The Current ‘Nuclear Renaissance’ in the United
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B. 10 C.F.R. § 52 Is an Improvement That Can Be Further Optimized
to Better Facilitate Generation IV Reactors
1. Part 52 Is Not Functioning as Intended
In 1989, the NRC introduced licensing under Part 52 to provide
developers with a more predictable and efficient licensing process suited
for new reactors (namely Generation III+) with more advanced features.68
In this regard, Part 52 would be useful for certifying Generation IV
reactors, as its objective is to resolve design issues up front, regardless of
how advanced or unfamiliar the technology may be.69
Despite the improvements under Part 52, the regulatory process is still
vulnerable to significant delays and cost overruns given the complexity and
uncertainty of examining a nuclear reactor.70 Furthermore, the “order of
operations” laid out by the NRC in Part 52 is not being executed as planned
due to the Commission’s flexibility.71 All four standard designs approved
by the NRC since Part 52 took effect incorporated amendments and
changes to their initial design specifications; for example, the Vogtle plant
AP1000 reactor incorporated an amendment to a previously certified
design.72 In other words, the four designs approved by the NRC since Part
52 took effect were not finalized by the time of the COL application, as all
four designs were eventually amended.
Despite the NRC’s original vision when authoring Part 52, licensees
pursued a COL in parallel with uncertified designs.73 There are several
factors that contribute to deviations from the Part 52 framework. For
example, responding to economic pressures, some licensees attempt to
States, Its Underlying Reasons, and Its Potential Pitfalls, 29 ENERGY L.J. 279, 338
(2008)).
68. See Repka & Sutton, supra note 4, at 39–40 (defining the NRC’s objective of
licensing newer, but still familiar, reactor technology); see also Gundlach, supra note 8,
at 623 (listing the features of Generation III+ systems, such as passive safety systems
that do not require operator intervention to shut down).
69. See Blanton et al., supra note 23, at 8 (elaborating on the flexibility Part 52
grants to licensees seeking a combined license).
70. Gundlach, supra note 8, at 642 (commenting on the financial impact of
uncertainty and construction schedule delays).
71. See Blanton et al., supra note 23, at 1, 3, 8.
72. See Design Certification Applications for New Reactors, supra note 34 (listing
pending design certification applications); see also Design Certification Application
Review - AP1000 Amendment, U.S. NUCLEAR REG’Y COMM’N, http://www.nrc.gov/
reactors/new-reactors/design-cert/amended-ap1000.html (last updated Mar. 29, 2012)
(noting that revisions to the AP1000 were submitted to the NRC roughly one year after
the design was approved). The amendment to the AP1000 initial design was finally
approved by the NRC on December 22, 2011. Press Release, Westinghouse, NRC
Grants Design (Dec. 22, 2011), http://westinghousenuclear.mediaroom.com/
index.php?s=43&item=303.
73. See NUCLEAR POWER PLANT LICENSING PROCESS, supra note 18, at 8 (noting
that changes to the certified design should only occur under “limited circumstances”).
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condense the schedule by filing COL applications in parallel with design
certification reviews.74 Additionally, the agency often must make a costbenefit analysis and focus on the most complete designs submitted,
delaying the progress for licensees with more incomplete designs and
prompting them to submit further changes or suspend the application
altogether.75 Lastly, design issues continue to present challenges to the
licensing framework, as advancements in technology and engineering
experience can induce post-certification changes that are inconsistent with
the design control document approved by the NRC.76
Referencing pending designs may not be consistent with the vision of the
new licensing scheme; however, it is expressly authorized under Part 52.77
The NRC anticipated these challenges during the first wave of COL
applications, and the agency works to manage the licensing proceedings to
give effect to the intent of Part 52 while allowing parallel proceedings to
continue.78 It therefore appears that the NRC is stretching to accommodate
the needs of its applicants while also trying to satisfy the original intentions
of Part 52.79
2. Licensing the Next Generation Nuclear Plant Prototype
As per the 2005 Act, the NGNP Project Team intends to establish a
regulatory framework and licensing scheme that enables the successful
licensing, construction, and operation of the reactor prototype.80 Since the
NGNP will use a new technology, the NRC recognizes the need for an
alternative licensing strategy and submitted a report detailing the
74. See Blanton et al., supra note 23, at 8–9 (explaining that some applicants were
hopeful for completion dates before 2020 and emphasizing the impact of design
amendments on the construction and regulatory timeline).
75. See id. at 9 (suggesting that the NRC is forced to selectively review
applications due to limited resources).
76. See id. at 10 (citing the example of General Electric’s advanced boiling water
reactor (“ABWR”), which incorporated an ITAAC incompatible with the design
already approved by the NRC and referenced a design element which was unable to be
engineered as planned); see also Design Certification Application Review—ABWR
Amendment, U.S. NUCLEAR REG’Y COMM’N, http://www.nrc.gov/reactors/newreactors/design-cert/amended-abwr.html (last modified Mar. 12, 2012) (detailing the
chronology of the ABWR amendment and NRC’s response).
77. See 10 C.F.R. § 52.55(c) (2012) (stating that applicants are permitted to
reference “a design for which a certification application has been docketed but not
granted,” doing so at their own “risk”).
78. The NRC has allowed parallel design and combined licensed proceedings when
the approach efficiently conserved NRC resources and maintained the “consistency” of
licensing regulations. See Blanton et al., supra note 23, at 11 (citing Progress Energy
Carolinas, Inc., CLI-08-15, 68 NRC 1, 4 (2008)).
79. See id. (concluding that, no matter how the process evolves, NRC must remain
flexible with applicants).
80. Energy Policy Act of 2005 §§ 641–643, 119 Stat. at 794; see 2010 NGNP
REPORT, supra note 50, at 14 (describing the team’s progress, as per the guidelines
established in the 2008 NGNP Report to Congress).

2012

FORWARD-LOOKING IMPROVEMENTS

221

Of the licensing alternatives
recommended licensing approach.81
considered, the NRC concluded that the NGNP prototype will be licensed
under Subpart C of Part 52.82 In terms of the licensing timeline, the
selected licensing approaches will benefit the NGNP by providing an
expedited timeframe for construction and final licensing.83 By requiring
only critical safety design elements to be passed on to the COL phase, the
NGNP team can obtain NRC approval before significant construction
begins and can thus identify “first-of-a-kind non-LWR” technical issues in
parallel to the COL review.84
III. THE NRC CAN PREVENT GENERATION IV DESIGN-RELATED
DELAYS BY REFORMING REGULATIONS AND FURTHERING
STANDARDIZATION EFFORTS
The technical complexity of Generation IV systems will make it more
difficult for developers to expeditiously adapt design specifications in the
initial years after the technology is deployed. Given the flexibility the
NRC allows in the licensing process currently,85 the next generation of
nuclear plants could continue to see delays and present economic barriers
to developers. As an alternative to the existing dual framework, the NRC
could make Part 52 licensing mandatory for untested or new reactor
technology and include more stringent rulemaking provisions for these
advanced systems to avoid the licensing delays of the past.86
In addition, the NRC should embrace a more aggressive standardization
policy to preempt licensing delays caused by the variety of available
designs.87 From an engineering standpoint, standardization offers greater
efficiency in the operation of a plant and will lower maintenance, training,
81. See 2008 NGNP REPORT, supra note 63, at 1 (acknowledging the challenge in
adapting current regulations to an unproven reactor design); see also GEN IV INT’L
FORUM, GIF R&D OUTLOOK FOR GENERATION IV NUCLEAR ENERGY SYSTEMS 11
(Aug.
21,
2009),
available
at
http://www.gen-4.org/PDFs/
GIF_RD_Outlook_for_Generation_IV_Nuclear_Energy_Systems.pdf [hereinafter GIF
R&D OUTLOOK] (describing the unique components and materials needed for the
VHTR, such as thicker reactor pressure vessels).
82. See 2008 NGNP REPORT, supra note 63, at 8–9 (acknowledging that the
applicant would not be required to submit a complete design).
83. See id. at 3 (characterizing the licensing, design, and construction strategy as
“aggressive”).
84. See id. at 10 (suggesting that the NRC’s recommended approach will provide
lessons for developing risk-informed criteria for future NGNP designs).
85. Blanton et al., supra note 23, at 8–11.
86. See T.L. Fahring, Nuclear Uncertainty: A Look at the Uncertainties of a U.S.
Nuclear Renaissance, 41 TEX. ENVT’L L.J. 279, 304 (2011) (arguing that, if it is indeed
more efficient and less costly, there is no downside to the new streamlined licensing
process).
87. Standardization involves confining reactors to one family of designs with few
engineering differences. NEI LICENSING FACTSHEET, supra note 2 (noting that
international experience demonstrates the advantages of reactor fleet standardization).
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and parts-procurement.88 Moreover, standardization would facilitate shared
learning among vendors and operators, leading to more predictability and
safety.89
While there are substantial benefits to this suggested approach,
standardization also presents a variety of technological and economic
challenges.90 Among the engineering challenges, there are difficult
questions about what degree of standardization is desirable and how to
develop uniformity for components.91 There are also safety concerns that
emerge with standardization, such as the inability to incorporate newly
developed safety features due to complacency among industry-side
developers who are “deterred” from altering previously approved plants.92
Additionally, a design defect may be undetected and replicated in each
standardized reactor.93
Standardization of reactor designs is not a novel solution, as the NRC
has stated before that it is a policy objective for the agency’s future.94 So
far, this policy has not yet fully materialized.95 The reactors in the United
States are distinct from one another and are virtually “one-of-a-kind.”96
France, conversely, has a higher degree of standardization in reactor types
than anywhere in the world and has benefited from significant savings due
to standardization in plant development.97 If it is to replicate a program on
88. Id.
89. See

WORLD NUCLEAR ASS’N, WNA REPORT: INTERNATIONAL
STANDARDIZATION OF NUCLEAR REACTOR DESIGNS 2 (2010), available at
http://world-nuclear.org/uploadedFiles/org/reference/pdf/CORDELreport2010.pdf
[hereinafter WNA STANDARDIZATION REPORT] (discussing the possibility of
developing best practices from shared feedback throughout “the full plant lifecycles of
a worldwide nuclear fleet”).
90. See Leonard M. Trosten & David M. Moore, Nuclear Power Plant
Standardization: Promises and Pitfalls, 15 WM. & MARY L. REV. 527, 528 (1974)
(discussing the gains to administrative efficiency when generic plant designs receive
prior approval).
91. See id. (describing tradeoffs when determining the scope of standardization; for
example, deciding “the extent to which components rather than criteria should be
standardized”).
92. Under the “engineering complacency” scenario, newly developed safety
features may be omitted from already pre-approved designs, posing a safety risk. See
id. at 531.
93. Fahring, supra note 86, at 296 n.192.
94. See Backgrounder on New Nuclear Plant Designs, U.S. NUCLEAR REG’Y
COMM’N, http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/fact-sheets/new-nuc-plantdes-bg.html (last updated Feb. 4, 2011) (“The NRC has long sought standardization of
nuclear power plant designs.”).
95. JOHN F. AHEARNE ET AL., THE FUTURE OF NUCLEAR POWER IN THE UNITED
STATES
19,
32
(2012),
available
at
http://www.fas.org/pubs/_docs/
Nuclear_Energy_Report-lowres.pdf.
96. See NEI LICENSING FACTSHEET, supra note 2 (commenting that standardization
would represent a departure from the first generation of reactors in the United States).
97. See id.; see also Tinu Mario Mathew, Nuclear Energy in France: Lessons to
Learn for India, INST. OF ENERGY MGMT. & RESEARCH 4 (Jan. 14, 2011), available at
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a scale similar to France, the NRC must address the aforementioned safety
risks to ensure that standardization will succeed, as safety is obviously a
critical component for long term nuclear energy growth.98
CONCLUSION
The current strategy for licensing the prototype NGNP, if extended to
other advanced reactors, may prove problematic. While Part 52 is a
marked improvement over two-step licensing, the same risks are present
today when design specifications are finalized in parallel to the COL phase
of licensing. Improvements to this process may help nuclear developers
avoid the same fate of the 1970s and 1980s and potentially save billions of
dollars in the process.99

http://greatlakes.edu.in/gurgaon/pdf/Nuclear_Energy_in_France.pdf (lauding France’s
standardized fleet, which facilitated cheaper generation due to economies of scale in
the component manufacturing process).
98. AHEARNE ET AL., supra note 95, at 31.
99. See Jonathan Kahn, Keep Hope Alive: Updating the Prudent Investment
Standard for Allocating Nuclear Plant Cancellations, 22 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 43,
47 (2011) (noting that plant cancellations in the 1980s “prompted Forbes magazine to
call the nuclear power industry ‘the largest managerial disaster in business history’”).

